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One of the main challenges in the formal modeling of common-sense
reasoning is the ability to cope with the dynamic nature of the world. Among
the approaches put forward to address this problem are belief revision and
update. Given a knowledge base T, representing our knowledge of the ‘‘state
of affairs’’ of the world of interest, it is possible that we are led to trust
another piece of information P, possibly inconsistent with the old one T. The
aim of revision and update operators is to characterize the revised knowledge
base T $ that incorporates the new formula P into the old one T while
preserving consistency and, at the same time, avoiding the loss of too much
information. In this paper we study the computational complexity, in the
propositional case, of one of the main reasoning problems of belief revision
and update: deciding if an interpretation M is a model of the revised
knowledge base.  2001 Academic Press
1. INTRODUCTION
Recently, many formalisms have been proposed in the AI literature to model
common-sense reasoning. Particular emphasis has been placed on the formal
modeling of a distinct feature of common-sense reasoning, that is, its dynamic
nature. The AI goal of providing a logic model of a human agent’s ability to reason
in the presence of incomplete and changing information has proven to be a very
hard one. Nevertheless, many important formalisms have been put forward in the
literature.
Given a knowledge base T, representing our knowledge of the ‘‘state of affairs’’
of the world of interest, it is possible that we are led to trust another piece of infor-
mation P, possibly inconsistent with the old one T. The aim of revision operators
is to incorporate the new formula P into the old one while preserving consistency
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and, at the same time, avoiding the loss of too much information. This process has
been called belief revision and the result of revising T with P is denoted as T V P.
This minimal change assumption was followed by the introduction of a large
number of specific revision operators. Among others, we mention Fagin et al. [6],
Ginsberg [9], and Dalal [4]. A general framework for belief revision has been
proposed by Alchourron, Ga rdenfors, and Makinson [1, 8]. A close variant of revi-
sion is update. The general framework for update has been studied by Katsuno and
Mendelzon [12, 13] and specific operators have been proposed, among proposed,
among others, by Winslett [19] and Forbus [7]. The difference between revision
and update is described in Section 2.1.
While most of the early work aimed at defining the appropriate semantics for
revision and update, recently, researchers have investigated the computational com-
plexity of reasoning with the operators introduced in the literature. To date, the
most complete complexity analysis has been done by Eiter and Gottlob [5]. More
precisely, Eiter and Gottlob address the problem of characterizing the complexity,
in a finite propositional language, of the following problem:
Given a knowledge base T, a new formula P and a query Q (represented
as propositional formulas), decide whether Q is a logical consequence of
T V P, the revised knowledge base.
In this paper we consider a distinct computational problem of belief revision and
update. Consider a knowledge base represented by a set of propositional formulae
T. Any such knowledge base can be equivalently represented by the set of its
models, denoted as M(T )=[M1 , ..., Mn]. We say that a model M is supported by
a knowledge base T if and only if M # M(T ), or equivalently M<T.
The problem we address in this paper is to decide whether a model is supported
by a revised knowledge base:
Given a knowledge base T, a new piece of information P (represented
as propositional formulas), and a model M, decide whether M #
M(T V P).
This problem is known as model checking. The importance of model checking in
AI and related fields has been convincingly advocated by Halpern and Vardi in
[10], where model-based representations are considered a viable alternative to the
standard approach of representing knowledge in terms of formulae. In model-based
representations the basic computational task is model checking, not inference. In
this setting it is also very important to study the computational complexity of
model checking.
While the computational complexities of inference and model checking are
related, there is no way to automatically derive the results for model checking from
those already known for inference. In fact, as our results show, there are operators
that have the same complexity w.r.t. query inference but with different complexity
w.r.t. model checking.
The paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 we recall some key definitions and
results for belief revision. In Section 3 we briefly present all the results and discuss
their relevance, while in Section 4 we prove the complexity results for the general
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case and in Section 5 we prove the results for the Horn case (i.e., when all the for-
mulae involved in the revision are in the Horn form). Finally, in Section 6 we draw
some conclusions.
2. PRELIMINARIES
In this section we (very briefly) present the background and terminology needed
to understand the results presented later in the paper. Throughout this paper we
restrict our attention to a (finite) propositional language.
The alphabet of a propositional formula is the set of all propositional atoms
occurring in it. Formulae are built over a finite alphabet of propositional letters
using the usual connectives c (not), 6 (or), and 7 (and). Additional connec-
tives are used as shorthands, :  ; denotes c: 6 ;, while :#; is a shorthand for
(: 7 ;) 6 ( c: 7 c;), and :; denotes c(:#;). A valuation of an alphabet X
is truth assignment to all the propositional letters in X. We will frequently denote
a valuation of an alphabet X with the subset of letters in X that are mapped into
true.
An interpretation of a formula is a truth assignment to the atoms of its alphabet.
A model M of a formula F is an interpretation that satisfies F (written M<F ).
Interpretations and models of propositional formulae will be denoted as sets of
atoms (those which are mapped into true). A theory T is a set of formulae. An
interpretation is a model of a theory if it is a model of every formula of the theory.
Given a theory T and a formula F we say that T entails F, written T<F, if F is
satisfied by every model of T. Given a propositional formula or a theory T, we
denote with M(T ) the set of its models. We say that a knowledge base T supports
a model M if M # M(T ), or equivalently M<T. A knowledge base T is consistent,
written T<% =, if M(T ) is nonempty. Moreover, we denote with F the inverse
operator of M; that is, given a set of models A, F(A) denotes one of the formulae
that have exactly A as its set of models.
In order to make formulae more compact and easier to understand, we introduce
a number of notations that we use in the rest of the paper.
The notation F[xy] denotes the formula F where every occurrence of the letter
x is replaced by the formula y. This notation is generalized to ordered sets: F[XY]
denotes the formula F where all occurrences of letters in X are replaced by
the corresponding elements in Y, where X is an ordered set of letters and Y is
an ordered set of formulae with the same cardinality. That is, F[XY]=
F[x1 y1 , ..., xk yk]. For example, let T=(x1 7 ( cx3 6 x2)), X=[x1 , x2 , x3], and
Y=[ y1 , y2 , y3]. Then the formula T[XY] is ( y1 7 ( cy3 6 y2)).
In order to make the formulae more compact and readable, we overload the
Boolean connectives to apply to sets of letters. For example, given three disjoint
sets of letters W, S, and R with the same number of elements k, we use the notation
( cS) as a shorthand for the formula [ csi | si # S], (S#R) to denote
[si #ri | 1ik], (S# cR) to denote [s i # cri | 1ik], and (W#(S#
cR)) for [wi #(si # cri) | 1ik]. For example, the formula
T 7 (W#(X# cY)),
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where T=(x1 7 ( cx3 6 x2)) is a shorthand for:
x1 7 ( cx3 6 x2) 7 [w1 #(x1 # cy1)]
7 [w2 #(x2 # cy2)] 7 [w3 #(x3 # cy3)].
2.1. Belief Revision and Update
Belief revision is concerned with the modeling of accommodating a new piece of
information (the revising formula) into an existing body of knowledge (the
knowledge base), where they might contradict each other. A slightly different
perspective is taken by knowledge update. For an interesting discussion on the
differences between belief revision and update we refer the reader to the work of
Katsuno and Mendelzon [13]. We assume that both the revising formula and the
knowledge base can be either a single formula or a theory.
We now recall the different approaches to revision and update, classifying them
into formula-based and model-based ones [12]. We use the following conventions:
the expression card(S) denotes the cardinality of a set S; the symmetric difference
between two sets S1 , S2 is denoted by S12S2 ; and the set difference is denoted by
S1 "S2 . If S is a set of sets,  S denotes the set formed intersecting all sets of S, and
analogously  S for union; min S denotes the subset of S containing only the
minimal (w.r.t. set inclusion) sets in S.
Formula-based Approaches
They operate on the formulae syntactically appearing in the knowledge base T.
Let W(T, P) be the set of maximal subsets of T which are consistent with the
revising formula P:
W(T, P)=[T $T | T $ _ [P]<% =, c_U : T $/UT, U _ [P]<% =].
The set W(t, P) contains all the plausible subsets of T that we may retain when
inserting P.
Ginsberg. Fagin et al. [6] and, independently, Ginsberg [9] define the revised
knowledge base as a set of theories: T VG P=[T $ _ [P] | T $ # W(T, P)]. This set of
theories must be interpreted as a disjunction of its members. In other words, the
result of revising T is the disjunction of all elements of the set composed of all maxi-
mal subsets of T consistent with P, plus P. Logical consequence in the revised
knowledge base is defined as logical consequence in each of the theories, i.e.,
T VG P<Q iff for all T $ # W(T, P), T $ _ [P]<Q. In other words, Ginsberg con-
siders all sets in W(T, P) equally plausible and inference is defined skeptically, i.e.,
Q must be a consequence of each set. Model checking is defined in a similar way:
M<T VG P if and only if M is a model of at least one theory in W(T, P).
A more general framework has been defined by Nebel [14]. Here we do not
analyze his definitions.
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WIDTIO. Since there may be exponentially many theories in T VG P, a simpler
(but somewhat drastic) approach is the so-called WIDTIO (When In Doubt Throw
It Out [18]), which is defined as T VWid P=( W(T, P)) _ [P].
Note that formula-based approaches are sensitive to the syntactic form of the
theory. That is, the revision with the same formula P of two logically equivalent
theories T1 and T2 may yield different results, depending on the syntactic form of
T1 and T2 . We illustrate this fact through an example.
Example. Consider T1=[a, b], T2=[a, a  b], and P= cb. Clearly, T1 is
equivalent to T2 . The only maximal subset of T1 consistent with P is [a], while
there are two maximal consistent subsets of T2 that are [a] and [a  b].
Thus, T1 VG P = [a, cb] while T2 VG P = [a 6 (a  b), cb]=[ cb]. The
WIDTIO revision gives the same results.
Model-based Approaches
These operators select the models of P on the basis of some notion of proximity
to the models of T. Model-based approaches assume T to be a single formula; if T
is a set of formulae it is implicitly interpreted as the conjunction of all its elements.
Many notions of proximity have been defined in the literature. We distinguish them
between pointwise proximity and global proximity.
We first recall approaches in which proximity between models of P and models
of T is computed pointwise w.r.t. each model of T. That is, they select models of
T one-by-one and for each one they choose the closest models of P. These
approaches are considered as more suitable for knowledge update [13]. Let M be
a model; we define +(M, P) as the set containing the minimal differences (w.r.t. set
inclusion) between each model of P and the given M; more formally:
+(M, P)=min[M2N | N # M(P)].
Winslett. Winslett [19] defines the models of the updated knowledge base as
M(T VW P)=[N # M(P) | _M # M(T ) : M2N # +(M, P)]. In other words, for each
model of T it chooses the closest (w.r.t. set-containment) models of P.
Borgida. Borgida’s operator VB [2] coincides with Winslett’s one, except in the
case when P is consistent with T, in which case the revised theory is simply T 7 P.
Forbus. This approach [7] takes into account cardinality: Let kM, P be the min-
imum cardinality of sets in +(M, P). The models of Forbus’ updated theory are
M(T VF P)=[N # M(P) | _M # M(T ) : card(M2N)=kM, P]. Note that, by means
of cardinality, Forbus’ update can compare (and discard) models which are incom-
parable in Winslett’s approach.
We now recall approaches where proximity between models of P and models of
T is defined considering globally all models of T. In other words, these approaches
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consider at the same time all pairs of models M # M(T ) and N # M(P) and find all
the closest pairs. Let $(T, P) be defined as follows:
$(T, P)=min .
M # M(T )
+(M, P).
Satoh. The models of the revised knowledge base are defined as M(T VS P)=
[N # M(P) | _M # M(T ) : N2M # $(T, P)]. That is, Satoh selects all closest pairs
(by set-containment of the difference set) and then projects on the models of P
[15].
Dalal. This approach is similar to Forbus’, but global. Let kT, P be the minimum
cardinality of sets in $(T, P); Dalal [4] defines the models of a revised theory as
M(T VD P)=[N # M(P) | _M # M(T ) : card(N2M)=kT, P]. That is, Dalal selects
all closest pairs (by cardinality of the difference set) and then projects on the
models of P.
Wrong Variables Revisions
These two revision operators are model based and are based upon the hypothesis
that the interpretation of a subset of the variables, denoted with 0, was wrong in
the old knowledge base T. The difference between them is based on a different
definition of 0. In Hegner’s revision, 0 is the set of the variables of P. The underly-
ing idea is that the original knowledge base T was completely inaccurate w.r.t.
everything mentioned in P.
Hegner. Let 0 be the variables of P. The models of Hegner’s revised theory
[18] are defined as M(T VH P)=[N # M(P) | _M # M(T ) : N2M0].
Weber’s revision [17] is slightly less drastic. It assumes that the letters whose
interpretation was wrong are a subset of the letters of P, i.e., only those occurring
in a minimal difference between models of T and P.
Weber. Same definition with 0= $(T, P).
2.2. Computational Complexity
We assume that the reader is familiar with the basic concepts of computational
complexity. We use the standard notation of complexity classes [11]. Namely, the
class P denotes the set of problems whose solution can be found in polynomial time
by a deterministic Turing machine, while NP denotes the class of problems that can
be solved in polynomial time by a nondeterministic Turing machine. The class coNP
denotes the set of decision problems whose complement is in NP. We call NP-hard
a problem G if any instance of a generic problem NP can be reduced to an instance
of G by means of a polynomial-time (many-one) transformation (the same for
coNP-hard).
Clearly, PNP and PcoNP. We assume, following the prevailing assumptions
of computational complexity, that these containments are strict, that is P{NP and
P{coNP. Therefore, we call a problem that is in P tractable and a problem that
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is NP-hard or coNP-hard intractable (in the sense that any algorithm solving it
would require a superpolynomial amount of time in the worst case).
We also use higher complexity classes defined using oracles. In particular PA
(NPA) corresponds to the class of decision problems that are solved in polynomial
time by deterministic (nondeterministic) Turing machines using an oracle for A in
polynomial time (for a much more detailed presentation we refer the reader to
[11]). All the problems we analyze reside in the polynomial hierarchy, introduced
by Stockmeyer [16], that is the analog of the Kleene arithmetic hierarchy. The
classes 7 pk , 6
p
k , and 2
p
k of the polynomial hierarchy are defined by
7 p0 =6
p
0 =2
p
0 =P
and for k0,
7 pk+1=NP
7pk, 6 pk+1=co7
p
k+1 , 2
p
k+1=P
7 pk.
Notice that 2 p1 =P, 7
p
1 =NP, and 6
p
1 =coNP. Moreover, 7
p
2 =NP
NP, that is the
class of problems solvable in nondeterministic polynomial time on a Turing
machine that uses for free an oracle for NP. The class PNP[O(log n)], often mentioned
in the paper, is the class of problems solvable in polynomial time using a
logarithmic number of calls to an NP oracle.
The prototypical 7 p2 -complete problem is deciding the truth of the expression
_X \Y .F, where F is a propositional formula using the letters of the two alphabets
X and Y. This expression is valid if and only if there exists a truth assignment X1
to the letters of X such that for all truth assignments to the letters of Y the formula
F is true. In the paper we also use a more restricted version, that is deciding the
truth of _X \Y . c6, where 6 is a set of 3CNF clauses (i.e., all clauses are com-
posed of three literals). It is immediate to show that deciding the truth of this quan-
tified Boolean formula is also a 7 p2 -complete problem.
3. OVERVIEW AND DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS
The complexity results are presented in Table 1. The table contains five columns.
The second and third show the complexity of model checking when T is a general
propositional formula, while the fourth and fifth show the Horn case. In the Horn
case we assume that P and all formulae in T are conjunctions of (possibly negative)
Horn clauses. In both cases, we consider two subcases: the second and fourth
columns refer to the case in which no constraint is assumed on the size of P
(‘‘generic’’), while the third and fifth columns contain the complexity result in the
case the size of P is assumed to be bounded by a constant (‘‘bounded’’).
In order to better appreciate the results we report in Table 2 the results on the
complexity of deciding T V P<Q obtained by Eiter and Gottlob [5]. The first
thing to notice is that the computational complexity of model checking for almost
all operators is at the second level of the polynomial hierarchy. This means that
model checking for belief revision is much harder than model checking for proposi-
tional logic (feasible in polynomial time).
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TABLE 1
The Complexity of Deciding Whether M<T V P
General case Horn case
P generic P bounded P generic P bounded
Ginsberg coNP-complete coNP-complete P P
(VG) (Theorem 1) (Theorem 12) (Theorem 17) (Theorem 17)
Forbus 7 p2 -complete P 7
p
2 -complete P
(VF) Theorem 3 Theorem 10 Theorem 16 Theorem 23
Winslett 7 p2 -complete P NP-complete P
(VW) Theorem 3 Theorem 10 Theorem 19 Theorem 23
Borgida 7 p2 -complete coNP-complete NP-complete P
(VB) Theorem 3 Theorem 12 Theorem 19 Theorem 23
Satoh 7 p2 -complete coNP-complete NP-complete P
(VS) Theorem 3 Theorem 12 Theorem 20 Theorem 23
Dalal PNP[O(log n)]-complete coNP-complete PNP[O(log n)]-complete P
(VD) Theorem 7 Theorem 12 Theorem 15 Theorem 23
Hegner NP-complete P P P
(VH) Theorem 8 Theorem 10 Theorem 18 Theorem 18
Weber 7 p2 -complete coNP-hard in P
NP[O(1)] NP-complete P
(VWeb) Theorem 9 Theorem 12 Theorem 21 Theorem 23
WIDTIO 7 p2 -complete 7
p
2 -complete NP NP
(VWid) Theorem 2 Theorem 14 Theorem 22 Theorem 22
TABLE 2
The Complexity of Deciding Whether T V P<Q [5]
General case Horn case
P generic P bounded P generic P bounded
Ginsberg 6 p2 -complete 6
p
2 -complete coNP-complete coNP-complete
Forbus 6 p2 -complete coNP-complete 6
p
2 -complete P
Winslett 6 p2 -complete coNP-complete coNP-complete P
Borgida 6 p2 -complete NP-hard and coNP-complete P
coNP-hard
in PNP[2]
Satoh 6 p2 -complete NP-hard and coNP-complete P
coNP-hard
in PNP[O(1)]
Dalal PNP[O(log n)]-complete NP-hard and PNP[O(log n)]-complete P
coNP-hard
in PNP[O(1)]
Weber 6 p2 -hard NP-hard and NP-hard P
coNP-hard
in P7
p
2[O(log n)] in PNP[O(1)] in PNP[O(log n)]
WIDTIO 6 p2 -hard 6
p
2 -hard coNP-hard coNP-hard
in P7
p
2[O(log n)] in P7
p
2[O(log n)] in PNP[O(log n)] in PNP[O(log n)]
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We now give an intuitive idea why these problems are all in 7 p2 . For simplicity
we only consider the model-based approaches, but this applies to the other systems
as well. In model-based approaches we have that M is a model of T V P if and only
if:
1. M<P and
2. There exists a model N of T that is ‘‘close’’ to M.
The first step is obviously feasible in polynomial time, while the second one
requires a nondeterministic choice of N and for each choice checking the ‘‘close-
ness’’ of M and N. This check can be performed with a new nondeterministic choice.
There are three exceptions to this rule: Dalal’s operator is complete for
PNP[O(log n)], while Hegner’s approach is NP-complete, and Ginsberg’s one is coNP-
complete. The most surprising result is the complexity of model checking for
Ginsberg’s operator: as shown in Table 2, inference for VG is as difficult as inference
for VF , VW , VB , and VS , while model checking turns out to be significantly simpler.
Restricting the size of the revising formula P has a dramatic effect on the com-
plexity of model checking for VF and VW . In fact, the complexity goes down two
levels. This phenomenon does not arise for query inference.
While restricting to Horn form generally reduces the complexity by one level
there are two exceptions: VD and VF . The intuitive explanation is that these two
operators use a cardinality-based measure of minimality that cannot be expressed
as a Horn formula. On the other side, set-containment-based minimality can be
expressed with a Horn formula.
There are some problems that we have been unable to completely characterize.
For Weber’s revision we do not have the exact complexity for the general case with
P bounded and the Horn case with P generic. However, in our opinion, the most
important open problem is the complexity of WIDTIO revision in the Horn case.
We know that the problem is in NP and that the two cases with P generic and P
bounded have exactly the same complexity. We conjecture that this problem is
NP-complete, but we have been unable to prove it.
4. GENERAL CASE
As said above, in this section we study the complexity of deciding whether
M<T V P, given T, P, and M as input.
For Ginsberg’s revision, model checking is easier than query answering. Namely,
it is one level down in the polynomial hierarchy. The significance of this result is
that model checking for Ginsberg’s operator is only a coNP problem, while its
query answering problem has the same complexity of the other operators (6 p2 -com-
plete).
Theorem 1. Deciding whether M<T VG P is a coNP-complete problem.
Proof. Given a model M, we first decide if M<P. This can be done in polyno-
mial time, and if this is not the case, the model is not supported by T VG P. Now,
we have that M<T VG P if and only if M satisfies at least one element of W(T, P).
Let T $ be the set of the formulae in T that are satisfied by M. This is a consistent
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set, since it has at least one model (M). To show that T $ is in W(T, P) we have to
prove that given any other formula f of T "T $, the set T $ _ [ f ] _ [P] is incon-
sistent. Thus, we have the following algorithm to decide whether M<T VG P.
1. Check if M<P (if not return false).
2. Compute T $=[ f # T | M<f ].
3. Decide, for any f # T "T $, if the set T $ _ [ f ] _ [P] is inconsistent.
The first two steps only require polynomial time, while the third one is a set of
(at most n) unsatisfiability problems that can be solved by a single call of a coNP
algorithm. This proves that the problem is in coNP.
Hardness follows by reduction from unsat. Given a propositional formula 6,
built over an alphabet X, we define
T=[r 7 6]
P=s
M=X _ [s],
where r and s are new letters not contained in X. Notice that T only contains one
formula. We show that M<T VG P if and only if 6 is unsatisfiable.
Suppose 6 is satisfiable: we have that T is consistent with P; thus T VG P=
T 7 P=[s, r, 6]. Since M does not include r we have that M<% T VG P.
Now assume 6 is unsatisfiable. We have that T is inconsistent; thus T VG P=P=s.
As a consequence M<T VG P. K
Even though Ginsberg’s and WIDTIO revisions are very similar, the complexity
results we obtain are different.
Theorem 2. Deciding M<T VWid P is 7 p2 -complete.
Proof. First of all, let us prove membership. By definition, a formula fi # T does
not belong to T VWid P if and only if there is a maximal T $T that is consistent
with P, but fi  T $.
Thus, to decide if M is a model of the revised base, we have to check that the
formulae of T not supporting M are ruled out by at least one maximal consistent
subset T $ of T. This can be done using the following algorithm.
1. Verify M<P.
2. For any f # T such that M<% f, check if there exists a T $T such that
(a) T $ _ [P] is consistent.
(b) T $ _ [ f, P] is inconsistent.
Indeed, if such a T $ exists, then it can be completed with elements of T in such
a way to obtain a maximal consistent subset of T not containing f. On the contrary,
if such a set does not exist for a formula f, then this formula is in the revised base,
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and then M is not a model of T $. This is a 7 p2 algorithm since it requires a non-
deterministic choice of T $ and, for any such choice, a consistency and an incon-
sistency check (doable in polynomial time using an NP oracle).
In order to prove 7 p2 -hardness we show a reduction from the prototypical
7 p2 -complete problem of deciding _X \Y .F, where F is a propositional formula on
the alphabet X _ Y.
Let T, P, and M be defined as
T=X _ X _ [ cF 7 r]
P=true
M=X,
where X =[ cx | x # X] and r is a new propositional variable not appearing in
X _ Y. We show that M<T VWid P if and only if _X \Y .F.
First of all, for any valuation of X, there is at least one maximal consistent subset
of T. Suppose X1 X represents a valuation of X: then T $=X1 _ [ cxi | xi  X1]
is consistent.
Hence, xi  T VWid P: just consider T $=[ cxi] _ [xj | i{ j]. This is a consistent
subset of T, and it does not contain xi . Thus, either T $ or T $ _ [ cF 7 r] is a max-
imal consistent subset of T, and it does not contain xi . Therefore, all atoms xi # X
and cxi # X do not belong to T VWid P.
Now, it can be either T VWid P=[ cF 7 r], or T VWid P=true. In the first case
M<% T VWid P, while in the latter one M<T VWid P.
Suppose that there exists a valuation X1 X such that F is valid for any Y. We
have that T $=X1 _ [ cx i | xi  X1] is consistent, but T $ _ [ cF 7 r] is not. Since
T $ does not contain cF 7 r, we have that this formula is not in the revised base;
hence T VWid P=true. As a result, M<T VWid P.
Suppose that for any X1 the formula F is not valid: T $ is still consistent, but so
is T $ _ [ cF 7 r]. As a result, any maximal consistent subset of T contains
cF 7 r, and T VWid P= cF 7 r. Hence, M<% T VWid P. K
We now turn our attention to the model-based operators. All the model-based
operators are based on the principle that a model M<P satisfies the result of a
revision M<T V P if and only if there is a model I<T such that I and M are suf-
ficiently close to each other.
It is not surprising that these methods have almost the same complexity (an
exception is Dalal’s revision that is a bit easier). However, although for query
answering the complexity could be proved with a single proof, for the model check-
ing problem each operator requires its own proof.
Theorem 3. Deciding M<T V P is in 7 p2 , where V # [VF , VW , VS , VB].
Proof. Given M, T, and P, let R= cF(M). Note that M<T V P if and only
if T V P<% R. Since the inference problem of deciding whether T V P<% R is in 6 p2 for
all the model-based operators (cf. Table 2), we have that model checking is in the
complementary class 7 p2 . K
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Theorem 4. Deciding M<T V P is 7 p2 -complete, where V # [VW , VB].
Proof. We will prove the 7 p2 -hardness of Winslett’s operator. The proof for
Borgida’s is similar. Let F be a propositional formula on the alphabet X _ Y. We
consider the 7 p2 -complete problem of deciding the validity of _X \Y .F. Let
T=(X#Z) 7 Y 7 w 7 r
P=(Z 7 cX 7 cY 7 r 7 cw) 6 [(X#Z) 7 (w#r) 7 (w# cF )]
M=Z _ [r].
Notice that (Z 7 cX 7 cY 7 r 7 cw)=F(M). We prove that _X \Y .F if and
only if M<T VW P.
First of all, we recall that, by definition, M(T VW P)=I # M(T ) F(I ) VW P.
Suppose _X \Y .F is valid. Let X1 be the valuation of X that makes F valid.
Now I=X1 _ Z1 _ Y _ [w, r] (with Z1=[zi | x i # X1]) is a model of T. Consider
the set F(I ) VW P. Since F is valid for any Y, the formula P has two kinds of model
(apart from M): the models with X=X1 and both w and r false and the models
with a different valuation of X. Note that none of these models can exclude M from
being a model of the result of the revision F(I ) VW P. The models with a different
evaluation of X are not less distant from I than M. Indeed, let J be that model: if
I contains both xi and zi , but J contains none of these literals, then J is not closer
to I than M, since the latter contains zi but not xi . The same argument holds if I
contains none of xi and zi but J contains both. The models with the same evalua-
tion of X, but that map w and r into false, are more distant from I than M, since
M and I agree on w and r while the other models disagree.
Suppose _X \Y .F is not valid. Then, for all the possible valuations of X, there
exists a valuation of Y that falsifies F. Now let I be the generic model of T. For any
valuation X1 of the variable X we can prove that M is never a model of F(I ) VW P.
Consider that for any X1 we have in P the model M$=X1 _ Z1 _ Y1 _ [w, r],
where Z1=[zi | xi # X1] and Y1 is the evaluation of Y that falsifies F. This model
is closer to I than M; thus M is not in the revised base.
The same proof can be used to prove the complexity of Borgida’s operator. K
Theorem 5. Deciding M<T VS P is 7 p2 -complete.
Proof. Given a propositional formula F, we prove that _X \Y .F is valid if and
only if M<T VS P, where
T=(XZ) 7 [(Y 7 cw 7 s 7 r) 6 ( cr 7 (w#s) 7 (s#F ))]
P= cX 7 cZ 7 cY 7 cw 7 cs
M=[r].
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Assume that there exists a subset X1 of X such that X1 _ Y1 <F holds for any
set Y1 Y. In this case, T contains two kinds of models,
I=X1 _ Z1 _ Y _ [s, r]
J=X1 _ Z1 _ Y1 _ [w, s],
where Z1=[zi | xi # X1].
The differences between models are represented in the following table.
M M$
I X1 _ Z1 _ Y _ [s] X1 _ Z1 _ Y _ [s, r]
J X1 _ Z1 _ Y1 _ [w, s, r] X1 _ Z1 _ Y1 _ [w, s]
The distance between I and M is incomparable with the other ones; thus M is
a model of the result. Notice that the models of T with a different valuation for the
variables X do not affect this result: given a model L=X2 _ Z2 _ } } } of T, if
X2 /X1 then Z2 #Z1 ; thus X2 _ Z2 /3 X1 _ Z1 , which implies L2M$/3 I2M.
Suppose now that for any set X1 /X there exists a set Y2 /Y such that
X1 _ Y2 <% F. This implies that T has a new kind of models, at least one for each
subset X1 of X,
K=X1 _ Z1 _ Y2 ,
where Z1=[zi | xi  X1].
Adding this model to the table of the differences leads to
M M$
I X1 _ Z1 _ Y _ [s] X1 _ Z1 _ Y _ [s, r]
J X1 _ Z1 _ Y1 _ [w, s, r] X1 _ Z1 _ Y1 _ [w, s]
K X1 _ Z1 _ Y2 _ [r] X1 _ Z1 _ Y2
In this new table, the distances between M and any model of T are not minimal.
As a result, M is not a model of T VS P. K
Theorem 6. Deciding M<T VF P is 7 p2 -complete.
Proof. We prove hardness by reduction from _ \QBF. Let 6 be a set of
propositional clauses using variables X _ Y. We assume, without loss of generality,
that |X|=|Y|=n. We prove that _X \Y . c6 if and only if M<T VF P, where
T=(X#Z) 7 cY 7 cW 7 cr
P=(X 7 cZ 7 cY 7 cW 7 r) 6 [(X#Z) 7 (YW) 7 cr 7 6]
M=X _ [r].
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Let us assume that there exists a subset X1 of X such that X1 _ Y1 <% 6 holds for
any set Y1 Y. Consider the following model of T,
I=X1 _ Z1 ,
where Z1=[zi | xi # X1]. We prove that M<F(I ) VF P. The distance between I and
M is
|I2M|=|X "X1|+|Z1|+1=n+1.
Now, consider a model N of (X#Z) 7 (YW) 7 cr 7 6. Since 6 is false for
each model extending X1 , a model of the latter formula must contain a different
subset of X. Thus, N must be a model of the kind
N=X2 _ Z2 _ Y2 _ W2 ,
where Y2 is such that X2 _ Y2 <6 and W2=[wi | yi  Y2]. The difference between
I and N is
|I2N|=|X12X2 |+|Z12Z2 |+ |Y2 |+|W2 |=|X12X2 |+|Z1 2Z2 |+n>n+1.
This is because X1 and X2 differ for at least one literal, and the same holds for Z1
and Z2 . The update P has two kind of models, namely M and the models of
(X#Z) 7 (YW) 7 cr 7 6. Since the models of the latter are not closer to I
than M, it follows that M is a model of F(I ) VF P; thus it is a model of T VF P.
Now, let us assume that there is no truth valuation X1 such that all the models
extending X1 over X _ Y falsify 6. Thus, for each X1 there exists a Y, such that 6
is satisfied by the model X1 _ Y1 . Consider an arbitrary model I of T,
I=X1 _ Z1 ,
where Z1=[zi | xi # X1]. We prove that M is not a model of F(I ) VF P (for any
I # M(T )), thus proving that M is not a model of T VF P. The distance between I
and M is
|I2M|=|X "X1|+|Z1|+1=n+1.
Since for each X1 there is a model X1 _ Y1 of 6, the formula P contains the
following model
N=X1 _ Z1 _ Y1 _ W1 ,
where W1=[wi | yi  Y1]. Consider the distance between I and N:
|I2N|=|Y1|+ |W1|=n.
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As a result, M is not a model of F(I ) VF P, and this holds for any I # M(T ).
Therefore, M is not a model of T VF P. K
Model checking for Dalal’s revision operator turns out to be computationally
simpler.
Theorem 7. Deciding whether M<T VD P is PNP[O(log n)]-complete.
Proof. Membership follows from complexity of inference: verifying whether
M<T VD P amounts to checking T VD P<% cF(M), which is PNP[O(log n)].
Hardness is proved by reduction from the problem uocsat: given a set of clauses
6=[#1 , ..., #m] over an alphabet X, decide whether its (cardinality) maximal con-
sistent subset is unique. Let X$, Y, and Y$ be new alphabets one-to-one with X,
while C and C$ are two alphabets of m letters each, one-to-one with the clauses of
6. We show that 6 has a unique (cardinality) maximal consistent subset if and
only if M<% T VD P, where
T= 
#i # 6
(ci  #i) 7 
#i # 6
(c$i  # i[xi yi]) 7 [d#(C#C$)]
7 (XX$) 7 (YY$)
P=C 7 C$ 7 cX 7 cX$ 7 cY 7 cY$
M=C _ C$.
First of all, notice that the condition XX$, together with the fact
P<cX 7 cX$, implies that the valuation of X in a model of T does not affect its
distance from P. The same holds for Y. Evaluating the distance between models of
T and models of P amounts to evaluating their assignments to the variables
C _ C$ _ [d].
Second, P has only two models, namely M and M$=M _ [d]. The only dif-
ference is the valuation of d. Suppose that the maximal consistent subset of 6 is
unique, and calculate the distance between T and M. Let 6$6 be this set. Con-
sider C1=[ci | #i # 6$] and C$1=[c$i | #i # 6$].
Clearly, C1 _ C$1 _ [d] can be extended with a suitable subset of X _ X$ _ Y _ Y$
to obtain a model of T. The distance between this model and M$ is 2(m&|6$| ). We
are able to prove that the distance between any model of T and M is at least
2(m&|6$| )+1. The above model of T is 2(m&|6$| )+1 far from M because of the
different valuation of d. For any other model of T with d false there must be at least
an i such that ci {c$i . Since the valuation of C corresponds to a consistent subset
of 6 (the same for C$), this implies that the number of true ci is less than |6$| (the
same may be for c$i instead). As a result, this model assigns true to |6$|+|6$|+v
variables, with v>0. Hence, the difference between it and M is (m&|6$| )+
(m&|6$|+v)=2(m&|6| )+v, with v>0. This implies M<% T VD P.
On the converse, suppose that 6 has two (or more) maximal consistent subsets
6$ and 6". One can build a model N of T assigning true to 2 |6$| variables among
C _ C$ such that d is false in N. The distance between N and M is now 2(m&|6$| );
thus M<T VD P. K
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We now establish the complexity of the operators that use a set of variables 0
whose observation is considered wrong, that is, Weber’s and Hegner’s ones.
Theorem 8. Deciding whether M<T VH P is NP-complete.
Proof. To prove membership to NP, note that M<T VH P is equivalent to the
following statements:
1. M<P and
2. _I # M(T ) such that the variables that differ between I and M are a subset
of the variables of P.
Since the first step can be accomplished in polynomial time and the second one
is feasible with an NP machine, this problem is in NP.
In order to prove hardness, consider the NP-complete problem of deciding the
satisfiability of a formula 6 on the alphabet X. Given
T=6 6 ( cr 7 cX)
P=X
M=X _ [r]
we can prove that 6 is satisfiable if and only if M<T VH P.
Suppose 6 is satisfiable: T contains a model I containing r. Hence the difference
between M and I is a subset of X, so M is in the revised knowledge base.
Suppose 6 is unsatisfiable: now T= cr 7 cX; thus the revised base is cr 7 X
that does not support M. K
The more complex definition of Weber’s revision shows up in a higher complexity
of model checking for his operator.
Theorem 9. Deciding whether M<T VWeb P is 7 p2 -complete.
Proof. By definition M<T VWeb P if and only if there exists a model I # M(T )
such that I2M0. The set 0 is the union of all the minimal differences between
models of T and models of P. Thus M<T VWeb P if and only if there exists three
models I<T, L<T, and M<P such that:
\xi # I2M, \N # M(T ), \O # M(P) {N2O/3 L2M andxi # L2M.
Since the internal check (N2O/3 L2M and xi # L2M) can be accomplished in
polynomial time, this problem belongs to 7 p2 .
The proof of hardness is similar to that of Satoh’s revision. Given a propositional
formula F, _X \Y .F holds if and only if M<T VWeb P, where
T=(XZ) 7 [(Y 7 cw 7 s 7 r 7 ct) 6 ( cr 7 ct 7 (w#s) 7 (s#F ))]
P= cX 7 cZ 7 cY 7 cs 7 cw 7 (r#t)
M=[r, t].
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Note that P has only two models, namely M=[r, t] and M$=<.
Suppose that there exists a subset X1 of X such that X1 _ Y1 <F holds for any
set Y1 Y. There are two kinds of models of T with this valuation for X,
I=X1 _ Z1 _ Y _ [s, r]
J=X1 _ Z1 _ Y1 _ [w, s],
where Z1=[zi | xi # X1]. The differences between models of T and models of P are
in the following table.
M=[r, t] M$=<
I X1 _ Z1 _ Y _ [s, t] X1 _ Z1 _ Y _ [s, r]
J X1 _ Z1 _ Y1 _ [w, s, r, t] X1 _ Z1 _ Y1 _ [w, s]
As a result, the pair (I, M) is one with a minimal difference among these. Note
that a model L of T with a different valuation for X must have L2M$ incomparable
with I2M (see the discussion for Satoh’s revision). Thus I2M0, which implies
that M is a model of T VWeb P.
Suppose now that for any set X1 X there exists a set Y2 Y such that
X1 _ Y2 <% F. This implies that T supports a new kind of model, at least one for
each subset of X,
K=X1 _ Z1 _ Y2 ,
which leads to a new row in the table of differences
M=[r, t] M$=<
I X1 _ Z1 _ Y _ [s, t] X1 _ Z1 _ Y _ [s, r]
J X1 _ Z1 _ Y1 _ [w, s, r, t] X1 _ Z1 _ Y1 _ [w, s]
K X1 _ Z1 _ Y2 _ [r, t] X1 _ Z1 _ Y2
where Z1=[zi | xi # X1]. Clearly, K2M$ is always contained in I2M, and this
happens for any subset of X. Furthermore, J2M$ is always contained in J2M. As
a result, there is no difference between a model of T and a model of P that is mini-
mal and contains t. As a result, t  0, and M is not a model of the result of the
revision. K
4.1. Bounded Case
In the previous section we investigated the complexity of evaluating model check-
ing on the revised knowledge bases. As it turned out, for most of the operators this
complexity is at the second level of the polynomial hierarchy. From an analysis of
the proofs, it turns out that this behavior depends on the new formula P being very
complex.
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However, in applications, it may be reasonable to assume that the size of the new
formula is very small w.r.t. the size of the knowledge base. This means that changes
to the knowledge base are incremental, since the revising formula can only contain
a bounded number of propositional variables. In this section we investigate the
impact of this assumption on the complexity of model checking. In particular,
throughout this section we assume that the size of the new formula P is bounded
by a constant (k in the following). Notice that this assumption can (in general) be
substituted by the weaker assumption that the size of P is bounded by a logarithm
of the size of T. Under this assumption, we obtain the following results.
Theorem 10. If |P|k, the complexity of deciding whether M<T V P is polyno-
mial, where V # [VF , VW , VH].
Proof. The polynomiality of Hegner’s revision can be easily proved from the
NP-membership proof of the general case. We recall that M<T VH P is equivalent
to the following statements:
1. M<P and
2. _I # M(T ) such that the variables that differ between I and M are a subset
of the variables of P.
When the size of P is bounded by a constant k, the number of its variables is
also bounded. As a result, the set of variables for which M and I can differ is also
bounded by k. The guessing of I can be replaced by an exhaustive verification over
all models that differ from I only for a subset of the variables of P. Since the car-
dinality of such a set is bounded by 2k, that is a constant, the number of possible
models to verify is also bounded by a constant.
For Winslett’s and Forbus’ operators, we can prove the polynomiality with the
same proof. Consider, for example, Winslett’s revision. A model M of P is in the
revision of T with P if and only if there exists a model I in T such that M is its
closest model. Consider that, given a model I, its closest model has exactly the same
valuation of I for the variables that are not in P. Hence, the double quantification
of the definition (M<T VF P iff there exists a I # M(T ) such that for all M$ # M(P)
it holds I2M$/3 I2M) is over a constant set of variables; thus the models we have
to consider (those of I and M$ that agree with M on the variables that are not in
P) are a constant number. For Forbus’ operator we have a similar motivation. K
Theorem 11. If |P|k, the complexity of deciding whether M<T V P is coNP-
hard, where V # [VG , VB , VS , VD].
Proof. We show that if an operator V satisfies the following three properties
then the problem of deciding whether M<T V P is coNP-hard.
1. If P is consistent then T V P is consistent;
2. T V P=T 7 P whenever T 7 P is consistent;
3. if T=[ f ], where f is a formula equivalent to cr, then T V r=r.
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Notice that the first two properties above are postulates 3 and 4 of the AGM
postulates [1] and that all operators in [VG , VB , VS , VD] satisfy these two
postulates, plus the third property.
Given a formula 6 on the alphabet X, we show that 6 is unsatisfiable if and only
if M<T V P, where
T=[r  (s 7 6)]
P=r
M=X _ [r].
Suppose 6 is satisfiable. Then T 7 P is consistent; thus T V P=T 7 P=
r 7 s 7 6, which does not support the model M, since M<cs.
Suppose 6 is unsatisfiable. Then T=[ f ], where f is equivalent to cr; thus
T V P=[ f ] V r=r, which supports the model M. K
Proving membership in coNP for all the above revision operators is quite simple,
with the only exception of VWeb .
Theorem 12. If |P|k, the complexity of deciding whether M<T V P is coNP-
complete, where V # [VG , VB , VS , VD].
Proof. Hardness for all these operators follows from the previous lemma. Mem-
bership to coNP for VG follows from the fact that this operator is in coNP even in
the general case. For VB , since the only difference from VW is the check of
unsatisfiability of T 7 P, membership to coNP easily follows.
For VS and VD , by definition M<T V P if and only if there exists a model
I # M(T ) such that, for any pair of models J # M(T ) and N # M(P), the distance
between J and N is not smaller than the distance between I and M (the distance
may be the difference or its cardinality, depending on whether we use VS or VD). It
is also easy to see that we can restrict I to models of T that coincide with M for
the variables not in P. As a result, the check ‘‘for all models I ’’ is indeed polyno-
mial, as there are at most a polynomial number of models I that coincide with M
for the variables not in P. As a result, model checking can be expressed as a check
‘‘for any pair of models J and N ’’ and is thus in coNP. K
Theorem 13. If |P|k, the complexity of deciding whether M<T VWeb P is
coNP-hard, in P[NP[O(1)].
Proof. Hardness follows from the previous lemma. Membership to PNP[O(1)]
immediately follows from the result of membership of inference with the same
assumption of the size of P [5]. K
On the other hand, WIDTIO semantics is not affected by the bound imposed on
the size of P.
Theorem 14. Even if |P|k, the complexity of deciding whether M<T VWid P is
7 p2 -complete.
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Proof. The problem with P unbounded is in 7 p2 ; thus the same holds for P
bounded. From the proof of hardness of the general case, one can note that the P
used in the reduction is actually P=true and is thus bounded. K
5. HORN CASE
So far, we have considered revision of arbitrary knowledge bases. However, it is
also of interest to consider the complexity for the case in which both the knowledge
base T and the new information P are in Horn form (i.e., they are conjunctions of
Horn clauses). Furthermore, it is also interesting to find the complexity in the case
in which both the Horn limitation and |P|k hold. In order to simplify the for-
mulae, we use the following notation: given a set of propositional clauses 6 over
an alphabet X, we denote with 6 neg the set of clauses obtained from 6 where each
positive literal xi is replaced by cx$i . Notice that 6 neg only contains negative
literals on the alphabet X _ X$ and is, therefore, in Horn form. This transformation
is often applied after a change of alphabet. In order to make our reductions
readable an example is in order. Let T=(x1 6 cx2) 7 ( cx1 6 x2). T[XY]neg
denotes the following formula:
T[XY]neg=( cy$1 6 cy2) 7 ( cy1 6 cy$2).
We now turn our attention to the complexity analysis. First of all, the car-
dinality-based revisions have the same complexity of the general (non-Horn) case.
Theorem 15. If T and P are Horn formulae, the model checking problem for VD
is PNP[O(log n)]-complete.
Proof. The membership is implied by the PNP[O(log n)] membership of the model
checking in the general case.
The hardness is proved by reduction from the problem of model checking for
Dalal’s revision in the general case. Let T and P be a theory and a formula, respec-
tively, and M a model. We prove that if T and P are consistent, then M<T VD P
if and only if M$<T $ VD P$, where
T $=T[XY]neg _ [ cY 6 cY$] _ [Y#Y1 # } } } #Yn] _ [Y$#Y$1 # } } } #Y$n]
_ P[XZ]neg _ [ cZ 6 cZ$] _ [Z#Z1 # } } } #Zn] _ [Z$#Z$1 # } } } #Z$n]
_ [W  (Y#Z)] _ [X#Z]
P$=Y 7 Y1 7 } } } 7 Z$n 7 W
M$=M _ Y _ Y1 _ } } } _ Z$n _ W,
where Y, Y1 , ..., Yn , Y$, Y$1 , ..., Y$n , Z, Z1 , ..., Zn , Z$, Z$1 , ..., Z$n , W are new
alphabets all one-to-one with X. The reduction works as follows: let I be a model
of T $. This model can be split into three parts, one that reflects a model of
T[XY]neg, one that reflects the value of P[XZ]neg, and the part regarding the
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comparison between them. Intuitively, the variables Y are used to represent a
model of T, while the variables Z are used for P. The formula cY 6 cY$,
together with the fact that P contains Y 7 Y$, implies that the models of T $ that
are closest to P$ are those for which I & Y is a model of T. This way, we are able
to express the models of a non-Horn theory (i.e., T ) with the Horn set T[XY]neg.
The same for P and P[XY] neg.
Moreover, T $ contains W  (Z#Y), and since P$ has W, the model I of T $ must
have the maximum possible number of variables Y equal to Z. Finally, since T $ has
X#Z and P$ has no constraint on X, the closest models of P$ must have X set to
the same value of the Z in the model of T $, which is a model of P that is closest
to T.
Let now formally prove the claim. Let I and J be a pair of models of T $ and P$,
respectively, such that their symmetric difference is minimal. We prove that
J & X=M, where M is one of the models of T VD P. The converse also holds, that
is, each model M of T VD P can be extended to form a model J that is a model of
T $ VD P$.
We prove the following facts:
1. The value of Y$ in I is exactly the opposite of the value of Y. The same
holds for Z$ and Z.
2. As a consequence, I & Y is a model of T[XY], and I & Z of P[XZ]. The
converse also holds: for each pair of models of T and P, there is a model of T $.
3. The models I & Y and I & Z correspond to a pair of models of T and P
whose difference is minimal.
4. The model J corresponds to a model of T VD P.
Proof of 1. First, we prove that the value of Y$ in I is exactly the opposite of
the value of Y. Since T is satisfiable, there exists a model Y1 of T[XY]neg over
Y _ Y$ such that yi # Y1 if and only if y i$  Y1 . The same holds for Z and Z$.
Extending these models to form a model I1 of T $, we have that the distance between
I1 and P is 2n(n+1), which is the part due to the yi ’s and zi ’s, plus the difference
over the wi ’s, which is at most n. Thus, the minimal distance between T $ and P$ is
at most 2n(n+1)+n.
Let us now prove that the value of Y in I is the opposite of the value of Y$. Since
T contains cyi 6 cy$i , if this is not true, then there exists an index i such that
neither yi nor y$i is in I. Now, consider the difference between I and P$. Since yi and
y$i are replicated n times, the fact that yi , y$i  I is amplified: thus the difference is
at least 2n(n+1)+n+1. Since there are models of T that differ only 2n(n+1)+n
from P, this would imply that I is not minimal. Since I is minimal by hypothesis,
we conclude that I & Y$ is the opposite of I & Y.
Proof of 2. This is easy to prove: since Y$ is the opposite of Y, we have that
[xi | yi # Y] is a model of T.
Proof of 3. Since P$ contains W, the model J contains also W. As a result, the
difference between I and J is given by the value 2n(n+1), which is due to the
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variables Y, ..., Z$n , plus the number of wi ’s that are not in I. The first part of the
difference is fixed; thus the difference is indeed the number of wi not in I. Since
wi # I implies yi=zi , this implies that the difference is equal to the number of
variables for which I & Y and I & Z differ. Since I & Y and I & Z correspond to
models of T and P, respectively, the model I is indeed the union of a pair of models
of T and P that are sufficiently close each other.
Proof of 4. The value of Z in T, and consequently the value of X, must coincide
with the value of one of the models of P that is closest to T.
Now, consider the formula P$. This formula does not contain the variables in X.
Thus, for the pair I and J to be close enough, the model J must have the value of
X equal to the value of X in I. As a result, the value of X in the models of P$ that
are closest to T $ is indeed a model of P that is closest to T. This proves that M$
is a model of T $ VD P$ if and only if M is a model of T VD P. K
Theorem 16. If T and P are Horn formulae, the model checking problem for VF
is 7 p2 -complete.
Proof. Membership is implied by the 7 p2 membership of model checking in the
general case.
Hardness is proved by a reduction from the 7 p2 -complete problem _ \QBF. Let
6 be a set of clauses. We prove that _X \Yc6 is valid if and only if M<T VF P,
where
T=[r1] _ R1 _ [r2] _ R2 _ [X#X$] _ Y _ Y$ _ [z]
P=( cr1 6 cr2) 7 (r1 #R1) 7 (r2 #R2) 7 (r1  (X 7 cX$ 7 cz)) 7 (r2  P$)
P$=(X#X$) 7 ( cY 6 cY$) 7 6[XY]neg
M=[r1] _ R1 _ X _ Y _ Y$,
where R1 and R2 are sets of 7n&1 variables.
First of all, there is exactly a model I of T for each evaluation of the variables
in X. Let X1 X be an interpretation over X, and let IX1 be the corresponding
model of T. We prove that F(IX1) VF P has M as a model if and only
6 7 [xi | xi # X1] 7 [ cx i | xi  X1]
is false for each possible evaluation of the variables in Y.
Let IX1 be the model of T associated to X1 and J be a model of P. The difference
between IX1 and M is
|IX12M|=|[r2] _ R2 |+|X "X1|+|X1|+|[z] |=8n+1.
If J does not contain either r1 or r2 , the distance between IX1 and J is at least
14n, while IX1 and M differ for 8n+1 variables. As a result, the models of P that
do not contain either r1 or r2 are not minimal.
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Let us consider a model J with r1 but not r2 . The model M is a model of this
kind. Furthermore, M is the closest model to IX1 having r1 but not r2 .
There are two kind of models with r2 . First assume that there is an index i such
that its evaluation of X is different from X1 . Let X2 be the value of J over X. The
distance between IX1 and J is:
|IX1 2J |= |[r1] _ R2 |+ |X1 2X2 |+ |Y|=8n+|X12X2 |8n+1.
As a result, J is not closer to IX1 than M.
Now consider the models J which have X1=J & X. These models depend on the
satisfiability of 6. Let us assume 6 satisfiable. Then it is possible to assign Y$ and
Y to the opposite values; thus it is possible to have a model J whose difference to
IX1 is
|IX12J |=|[r1] _ R1|+ |Y|=8n.
As a result, if 6 is satisfiable when X is forced to be X1 , then M is not a model
of T VF P.
Assume 6 is unsatisfiable. In this case, it is impossible to assign to Y and Y$
opposite evaluations. As a result, there is at least an index i such that both yi and
y$i are false; thus the difference between IX1 and J is
|IX1 2J | |[r1] _ R1|+ |Y|+1=8n+1.
This implies that M is a model of T VF P.
Summarizing, we have proved that, given an evaluation X1 over X, the model M
is a model of IX1 VF P if and only if the set 6 is valid once we have assigned the X
to have the value X1 . This is true for all the possible X1 . As a result, M is a model
of T VF P if and only if there exists a value X1 such that IX1 VF P contains M, which
is equivalent to say that there exists a X1 such that for all Y the set of clauses 6
is false. K
For Ginsberg’s and Hegner’s revisions, the complexity decreases: they become
tractable.
Theorem 17. If T and P are Horn formulae, the model checking problem for VG
is polynomial.
Proof. The algorithm given in the proof of Theorem 1 is polynomial if T and P
are Horn formulas. Indeed, the only nonpolynomial steps were the checks of incon-
sistency of T $ _ [ f ] _ [P]. Since this is a Horn formula, this check can be done in
polynomial time. K
Theorem 18. If T and P are Horn formulae, the model checking problem for VH
is polynomial.
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Proof. We recall that M<T VH P is equivalent to the following statements:
1. M<P and
2. _I # M(T ) such that the variables that differ between I and M are a subset
of the variables of P.
Let X be the alphabet of T, Y the alphabet of P, and Z=X _ Y. We construct
a new formula
T $=T 7 [zi | zi # (M "Y)] 7 [ czi | zi # (Z "M), zi # (Z "Y)].
Notice that any model N of T $ satisfies statement (2) above. Therefore, since
satisfiability checking of a Horn formula is polynomial, model checking can be
performed in polynomial time. K
For the revision operators of Satoh, Winslett, and Borgida, the complexity
decreases one level.
Theorem 19. If T and P are Horn formulae, the model checking problem for VW
and VB is NP-complete.
Proof. We start with VW . The check M<T VW P can be done by guessing a
model I # M(T ) such that there is no model J # M(P) such that I2J/I2M. Given
I, this check is polynomial. Indeed, it is equivalent to the consistency of the Horn
formula
P 7 
xi # I, xi # M
xi 7 
xi  I, xi  M
cxi 7 \ xi # I, xi  M xi 6 xi  I, xi # M cx i+ .
This formula has a model J if and only if J is a model of P, and if I and M coincide
on the variable xi , then J has the same value on that variable. Furthermore, there
must be an xi such that I and M differ on it, while I and J agree.
As a result, model checking is in NP, since it amounts to check whether
M # M(P) and to guess a model I such that the above formula is unsatisfiable.
Since that formula is Horn, this check is polynomial.
The hardness of Winslett’s update is proved by reduction from the NP-complete
problem 3sat. Let 6=[#1 , ..., #m] be a set of clauses over X. We prove that 6 is
satisfiable if and only if M<T VW P, where
T=6neg
P=(X#X$)
M=X _ X$.
Let us assume 6 satisfiable and let G be a model of 6. Then
I=G _ [x$i | xi  G]
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is a model of T. We prove that M is one of its closest models of P. First of all, the
symmetric difference between them has the following property: for each i, either xi
or x$i is in I2M, but not both. This is because in I the values of xi and x$i are dif-
ferent, while in M they coincide. Consider any other model J of P. According to the
same argumentation, either xi or x$i is in I2J, for each i. As a result, I2J/3 I2M.
Let us assume 6 unsatisfiable. Let I be an arbitrary model of T. Since T contains
cX 6 cX$, we have that for any i either xi or x$i is not in I. Moreover, since 6
is unsatisfiable, there is at least an index k such that both xk and x$k are false. Now,
consider the symmetric difference between I and M. This set contains either xi or
x$i , for each i. Moreover, for the index k it holds [xk , x$k]/I2M. Now, consider the
model J of P:
J=M "[xk , x$k].
We have
I2J=(I2M)"[xk , x$k].
As a result, I2J/I2M. Thus, the model M is not one of the models of P closest
to I. Since this proof holds for any I # M(T ), the interpretation M is not a model
of T VW P.
Let us now turn to Borgida’s revision. The only difference between it and
Winslett’s operator being the check of consistency of T _ [P], which is polynomial
for Horn formulas, we obtain that M<T VB P is in NP.
The proof of hardness of VW can be rewritten for VB as well. Just consider
T $=T 7 w, P$=P 7 cw. Since T _ [P] is inconsistent, the result T $ VB P$ is iden-
tical to T VW P. As a result, M<T $ VB P$ if and only if M<T VW P, which is equiv-
alent to the satisfiability of the set of clauses 6. K
Theorem 20. If T and P are Horn formulae, the model checking problem for VS
is NP-complete.
Proof. Membership is proved in a manner similar to the previous theorem.
Indeed, M<T VS P if and only if there exists a model I of T such that there does
not exist a pair J, M$ such that J2M$/I2M. The test that there does not exist a
pair J, M$ such that J2M$/I2M can be done in polynomial time, if T and P are
Horn formulas. Indeed, given M and I, the above test is equivalent to verifying
unsatisfiability of the Horn set
T[XY] 7 P 7 
xi  I2M
( y i#xi) 7 
xi # I2M
( yi#xi).
Indeed, the above formula is satisfiable if and only if there exists a model of T and
a model of P such that their difference is strictly contained in I2M.
67BELIEF REVISION: COMPLEXITY OF MODEL CHECKING
NP-hardness is proved by reduction from the NP-complete problem sat. Let 6
be a set of clauses. We prove that 6 is satisfiable if and only if M<T VS P, where
T=6neg _ [ cX 6 cX$] _ [X 6 X$  Z] _ {\ zi+ r=_ [r#u]
P=X 7 X$ 7 cZ 7 cr
M=X _ X$ _ [u].
Note that GX is a model of 6 if and only if G _ [x$i | xi  G] is a model of
#j # 6 #
neg
j .
Assume that 6 is satisfiable, and let GX be a model of 6. The following inter-
pretation is a model of T:
I=G _ [x$i | xi  G] _ Z _ [r, u].
The symmetric difference between I and M is
I2M=X "G _ [x$i | xi # X] _ Z _ [r].
We prove that the difference between I and M is a minimal one, i.e., there do not
exist two other models, J and N, of T and P, respectively, such that J2N/I2M.
We assume J2NI2M and prove that this implies I2MJ2N.
Let X1=J & X and X$1=J & X$. Since X _ X$N, it follows that
(J2N) & (X _ X$)=X "X1 _ X$"X$1 .
Since J2N & XI2M & X, we obtain X "X1 X "G, which implies GX1 . Since
X1 _ X$1 is a model of each cxi 6 cx$i , we have that X$1 [x$i | x i  G], which in
turn implies X$"[x$i | xi  G]X$"X$1 . Since X$"[x$i | xi  G]=J2N & X$, and
X$"X$1=I2M & X$, we have that X$1=[x$i | xi  G], and thus X1=G. This implies
J & Z=I & Z=Z, which implies [r, u]J. Thus J=I. Now, the model of P that
is closest to I is M; thus I2MJ2N.
Assume 6 is unsatisfiable. We consider an arbitrary model I of T that is one of
the closest to M and then prove that I2M is never a minimal difference (i.e., there
is always another pair of models J and N whose difference is lesser). Let I be a
model of T, X1=I & X, and X$1=I & X$. Since 6 is unsatisfiable, 6 neg cannot have
models X1 _ X$1 if X$1=[x$i | xi  X1]. Since cxi 6 cx$i is satisfied by I, there must
be at least an index i such that x i  X1 and x$i  X$1 .
If either xi or x$i is true in a model of T, then zi must also be true in that model.
However, in the model I, neither xi nor x$i is true: thus zi can be true or false. Sup-
pose, without loss of generality, that the conditions xi  X1 and x$i  X$1 hold exactly
for one value of i. If zi is true in the model I, r and u must also be true in I. This
is the first possible form of I:
I1=X1 _ X$1 _ Z _ [r, u].
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However, zi can very well be false. In this case r can be true or false, and u has
the same value. Thus, we have two possibilities:
I2 =X1 _ X$1 _ Z "[zi] _ [r, u]
I3=X1 _ X$1 _ Z "[zi].
Let us now consider the differences between these models and M. Since I22M/
I12M, we need not consider I1 any longer. About I2 and I3 we have
I22M=X "X1 _ X$"X$1 _ Z "[zi] _ [r]
I32M=X "X1 _ X$"X$1 _ Z "[zi] _ [u].
Now, consider the model N=X _ X$. This is a model of P. Moreover, I22N is
strictly contained in I22M, and I32N is strictly contained in I32M. As a result,
there is no model I of T such that I2M is minimal. Thus M is not a model of
T VS P. K
Finally, for Weber’s revision the complexity decreases ‘‘almost’’ one level.
Theorem 21. If T and P are Horn formulae, the model checking problem for
VWeb is NP-complete.
Proof. Membership: M<T VWeb P holds if and only if there exists a model
I # M(T ) such that, for each xi # I2M, there exists a pair of models J # M(T )
and N # M(P), such that xi # J2N and for each pair of models J$ # M(T ) and
N$ # M(P), J$2N$/J2N does not hold. The test ‘‘for each pair of models J$ and
N$...’’ is polynomial since T and P are Horn. Moreover, since there are only a linear
number of variables, the test ‘‘for each xi # J2N’’ can be rewritten as an and of n
formulas.
In short, to test whether M<T VWeb P, guess a model I of T and n pairs of
models (Ji , Ni) such that if xi # I2M, then xi # Ji2Ni and the Horn formula
T[XY] 7 P 7 
xi  Ji 2Ni
( y i#xi) 7 
xi # Ji 2Ni
( yi#x i)
is unsatisfiable. This formula has a model if and only if there is a pair of models
that is close to each other more than Ji and Ni are.
Hardness: let 6 be a set of clauses. We prove that 6 is satisfiable if and only
if M<T Vweb P, where
T=6neg _ [ cX 6 cX$] _ [X 6 X$  Z] _ {\ zi+ r=
_ [r  u 7 cw] _ [u 6 cw]
P=X 7 X$ 7 cZ 7 cr 7 ( cu 6 w)
M=X _ X$ _ [w].
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The proof is similar to that of Satoh. Let I and J be a pair of models of T and P,
respectively, such that their difference is minimal. Let us suppose 6 is unsatisfiable.
We prove that neither u nor w are in I2J, thus proving that they are not in 0
either.
Since 6 is unsatisfiable, there exists an index i such that neither xi nor x$i are
in I. As a result, the value of zi and r can be either true or false. Now, consider the
case
I & [zi , r, u, w]=<
J & [zi , r, u, w]=<.
This is possible, according to our definition of T and P. In this case, we have that
I2J & [zi , r, u, w]=<. This proves that it is always possible to extend I in such a
way the difference between I and J does not contain the variables in [zi , r, u, w].
As a result, neither u nor w is in 0.
The interpretation M is not a model of T VWeb P, since it has w but not u, and
no model of T has this property. Since neither u nor w is in 0, the models of
T VWeb P must have on u and w the value of a model of T. As a result, M is not
a model of the revised base.
Let us suppose 6 is satisfiable. In this case, as proved in the proof of hardness
for Satoh’s revision, there exists a pair of models I and J whose difference is mini-
mal, such that r # I. This happens because no model without r can have so small
a distance to P over X _ X$. As a result, we have u # I and w  I. No model of P
has both these properties. There are models with the first but not the second, and
vice versa. For the first ones it holds u # I2J, and for the second ones it holds
w  I2J. As a result, u, w # 0. There is no model of T having the same evaluation
of u, w of M, but since u, w # 0, these variables are not counted as ‘‘different.’’ Thus,
M # T VWeb P. K
Theorem 22. If T and P are Horn formulae, the model checking problem for
VWid is in NP.
Proof. Let T be a set of Horn clauses and P a Horn formula. The problem of
model checking for VWid can be determined by an oracle-powered machine as
follows: to prove that J<T VWid P, consider each f # T such that J  M( f ). If there
exists a set T $T such that f  T $, T $ _ P is consistent and T $ _ [g] _ P is incon-
sistent for each g # T "T $ then J<T VWid P. All the consistency checks are polyno-
mial since the involved formulas are Horn. As a result, the whole problem requires
a single guessing, and thus is in NP. K
If we also assume that the size of P is bounded by a constant k we obtain that
model checking becomes tractable for all operators (except VWid).
Theorem 23. If T and P are Horn formulae and |P|k, the model checking
problem for VG , VF , VW , VB , VS , VI and VWeb is polynomial.
Proof. The model checking problem M<T V P can be rewritten as the query
answering problem T V P<% F(M). Since F(M) is a Horn formula, and the above
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query answering problem has been proved to be polynomial [5], we conclude that
the model checking problem is also polynomial, for all the revisions considered in
the statement of the theorem. K
6. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have investigated a key issue of belief revision systems: their
computational feasibility. Namely, we have studied, in a propositional language, the
problem of deciding whether a model is supported by a revised knowledge base. As
it turns out, model checking for belief revision and update is far more complex than
model checking for classic propositional logic.
Some questions are left open by this work. First, the complexity of model checking
has not been exactly determined in all cases: for Weber’s semantics, in the bounded
case, we have only been able to prove that model checking can be done with a
constant number of calls to an NP oracle and that the problem is coNP-hard.
An entire line of related research, not investigated in this work, is the investiga-
tion of belief revision operators w.r.t. their relative space efficiency. In the
framework of space efficiency [3], knowledge representation formalisms are com-
pared in terms of their ability to represent knowledge in little space. Since
knowledge bases are used to represent models, it makes sense to investigate how
good different revision operators are with respect to their ability to represent the set
of models of the revised knowledge base in little space.
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